Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor through the Tax System by Book, Leslie
Working Paper Series
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Year 2006
Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring:
Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor
through the Tax System
Leslie Book
Villanova University School of Law, book@law.villanova.edu
This paper is posted at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art55
1Leslie Book*
8.9.06
Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working
Poor through the Tax System
I. Introduction
A. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC): Participation, Costs and Errors
A refundable credit worth as much as $4,400 in cash for lower-income workers with at
least two children, the EITC is one of the largest federal transfer programs and is the country’s
primary means of reducing poverty among families with children.1 In 2003, workers claimed
over $38 billion in EITC, with over 88 percent of the EITC refunded directly to taxpayers, rather
than reducing pre-credit income tax liability.2 Unique among transfer programs in that it relies on
a system of self-declaring eligibility (in the form of an annual filing of a tax return), rather than
extensive, and often in-person, pre-eligibility screening, the EITC benefits from extraordinarily
high participation rates3 and low direct administrative costs relative to other transfer programs.4
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Leandra Lederman and Lawrence Zelenak for helpful comments on an earlier version of the article.
I am grateful for the work of my research assistants, Katrina Kayden, Meegan Hollywood, Si Nae Lim, and John
Guinan.
1 Steve Holt, The EITC at Age 30: What We Know 8 (Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060209_Holt.htm (highlighting the EITC’s effect on reducing poverty and
encouraging work); Alan Berube, The New Safety Net: How the Tax Code Helped Low-Income Working Families
During the Early 2000s 2 (Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/eitc/20060209_newsafety.htm (noting that the EITC is the country’s largest
antipoverty program targeted to families with children).
2 Alan Berube, The New Safety Net: How the Tax Code Helped Low-Income Working Families During the Early
2000s 1 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/eitc/20060209_newsafety.htm.
3 Participation in the EITC greatly exceeds that in other transfer programs. For example, as a result of cumbersome
pre-certification process involved in obtaining food stamps, the participation rate for the food stamp program (FSP)
is only a little higher than 50%. On the other hand, the participation rate among eligible families for the self-
declaring EITC is approximately 90%. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1004-05 (2004).
4 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1867, 1882 (2005).
2High participation and low direct administrative costs suggest that the relatively recent
experiment of using the tax code to deliver refundable credits to supplement low-wage labor and
reduce poverty is a success.5 In fact, academics and policymakers alike have praised the EITC as
a tool for transferring benefits.6 Yet, the IRS is facing a crisis in administration. Rather than
receiving praise for its efficient administration, the IRS is often caught in a vise, criticized by
some in the executive and legislative branches as permitting too much program error, with
almost 1/3 of the EITC claimed erroneously.7 In response to these criticisms, the IRS has
implemented a series of compliance efforts that the media, advocates and some legislators have
criticized as heavy-handed and unfair to the country’s working poor.8
The EITC’s error rate is high, in large part because the IRS has no extensive bureaucracy
to pre-determine eligibility, and instead has largely relied on a small number of post-application
correspondence-based eligibility audits following the filing of a tax return to determine whether
a claimant is eligible.9 While high error rates are indirect costs, not directly appearing as line
items on the IRS’s budget, they detract from the program’s effectiveness.
5 The EITC was enacted in 1975. Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, H.R. 9968, 94th Congress (1975). It was
expanded significantly in the 1990s. For a discussion of the history and growth of the EITC, see Dennis J. Ventry,
Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 53 NAT’L
TAX J. 983 (2000).
6 This is not to suggest necessarily that all transfer programs should be effected through the tax system. For a
discussion of how institutional design should influence which part of government houses a program, see David A
Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1010-12 (2004)
(noting the EITC’s lower administrative costs and high participation, but pointing out key institutional differences
between traditional transfer programs and benefits delivered through the tax system); see also Anne L. Alstott, The
Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995)
(noting that the tax system is not ideally situated to perform all of welfare’s functions, including responsiveness to
recipients’ shorter term needs).
7 See OMB Calls IRS EITC Compliance ‘Ineffective’ (2006), available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today,
2006 TNT 26-43.
8 See The I.R.S. Goes After the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at 12; David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Move Said to Hurt
The Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at C6 (discussing the refund freeze).
9 The numbers are small relative to other benefits’ programs where there is universal pre-benefits eligibility test.
Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1877-78 (2005). The numbers do not seem small when compared with other taxpayers, as EITC claimants face
higher audit rates than other taxpayers. For data on the audit rate of EITC claiming taxpayers compared to returns
without EITC claims, see National Taxpayer Advocate, 2005 Annual Report to Congress, 102, Table 1.5.2 (2.25
3Congressional concern with the EITC’s high error rates has led to an extensive
compliance initiative over a seven-year period that has not materially reduced the EITC’s error
rate and thus the proportion of undeserving claimants receiving EITCs. The failure to reduce
errors through traditional means in the tax system led to proposals that have their pedigree in
compliance efforts found in traditional benefits programs, like certification of eligibility prior to
the establishing eligibility10 and a civil penalty disallowance regime that would prevent even
eligible individuals from claiming the EITC if in past years they recklessly or fraudulently
claimed the EITC.11 These radical proposals would fundamentally change the administration of
the EITC and the nature of the IRS. It has also led the IRS to take extraordinary actions12 that
jeopardize basic due process rights, like freezing without notice and hearing refunds suspected to
arise from fraudulent claims.13
percent audit rate for individuals claiming an EITC compared with an approximate 1.8 percent audit rate for
individuals with receipts in excess of $100,000; non EITC-claiming lower-earning taxpayers had even lower audit
rates).
10 The IRS’s certification program focused on EITC claimants establishing that they had the same principal place of
abode for more than one-half of a year. Announcement 2003-04, 2003-1 C.B. 1132 (discussing IRS plans to require
certain taxpayers to establish that they satisfied the residency requirement with a child or children prior to or at the
time of the filing of a tax return); see also IRS Status Report to Congress, IRS Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
Initiative, ii-vi (2005) (discussing the results of the IRS’s first pilot program requiring 25,000 taxpayers to certify
residence). Preliminary data taken from the certification pilot indicates that certification efforts on the part of the
IRS may have the effect, in the aggregate, of protecting against millions of dollars of erroneous EITC claims.
Certification of eligibility is almost universal for other means-based benefits programs. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or
Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1869-71 (2005).
11 I.R.C. § 32(k) provides a disallowance period if there is a final determination that the EITC was due to reckless or
intentional disregard of rules or regulation (two years) or fraud (10 years). For a similar disallowance provision in
the food stamp program for making false or misleading statements, withholding or misrepresenting facts, see 51
U.S.C. § 2015(b) (disqualification period varies based on the number and type of violation).
12 In an extremely perceptive article, Professor Alstott noted that the EITC’s susceptibility to error resulted, in part,
from its tax-based administration and that reducing some of the EITC’s weaknesses (like error rate) required “either
compromising the benefits of tax-based administration or undertaking a major restructuring of basic institutions of
the federal tax system.” Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare
Reform, 108 HARV L. REV. 533 (1995). The recent certification and refund freeze proposals reflect the type of
changes Professor Alstott foreshadowed over 10 years ago.
13 See 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANN. REP. (Dec. 2005); Guilty Until Proven Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006,
at 16; David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Move Said to Hurt The Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at C6 (criticizing the
refund freeze program).
4B. The Potential Backfire Risk
Critics of the IRS’s extraordinary actions to prevent error in the EITC have been vocal,
emphasizing the unfairness of IRS focus on the poor and the likely negative effects that the IRS’s
actions would have on program participation.14 The media and many in Congress have
challenged the IRS’s refund-freeze policy as unfair, and it is alien to the traditional governmental
standards of affording notice and hearing prior to what can be a long period of delay.15 With this
context in mind, it is important to emphasize that the IRS has a difficult task in administering the
EITC. Founded as an agency with its primary mission to collect revenues (not an easy job in its
own right), it has, largely by historical accident, found itself responsible for distributing funds
that can mean the difference between living in or out of poverty. Congress and other parts of the
executive branch have taken the IRS to task about the EITC’s error rate. When the IRS reacts
and attempts to reduce the error rate, it has found its actions largely ineffective.16 Moreover, its
actions seem heavy-handed, spurring legislators and others to criticize the IRS as unfairly
picking on the little guy when there are far bigger fish to fry.17
In a recent and insightful article, Professor Lawrence Zelenak notes that the controversy
surrounding the IRS’s compliance and enforcement efforts is a consequence of its status as a
hybrid tax-transfer program. Its precarious position, according to Zelenak, stems from its
administration largely as a tax program, but its economic effect largely as a welfare-type
14 See, e.g., Robert Greenstein, The New Procedures for the Earned Income Tax Credit, 99 TAX NOTES 1525 (2003)
(arguing that IRS pre-certification efforts would decrease participation among eligible participants); See Guilty Until
Proven Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at 16. (noting the opposition to the IRS’s efforts to freeze EITC-
generated refunds).
15 See Guilty Until Proven Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at 16.
16 Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
148, 179 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (noting that recent compliance efforts have reduced some of
the noncompliance, especially among so-called tie-breaker errors where more than one potentially eligible person
could claim the EITC, but that error rates “may still be considered too high”).
17 See Guilty Until Proven Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at 16 (noting how IRS focus on the EITC seems
shortsighted, given the compliance issues facing wealthier taxpayers, such as the IRS’s scant efforts to pursue the
illegal sheltering of offshore income, costing approximately $20 billion to $40 billion a year).
5program. Zelenak argues that the EITC’s hybrid status is a benefit in that its tax pedigree helps
ensure a combination of high participation and lack of direct administrative costs, making it
preferable to other transfer programs which have lower error rates, but higher administrative
costs and lower participation. Zelenak offers little in terms of prescriptive advice as to how the
IRS or Congress should fashion its compliance efforts, other than the suggestion that too much
resistance to compliance initiatives could backfire, and result either in (1) a Congressional
rejection of the “EITC as tax” analogy and transfer administration away from the IRS or (2) a
refrain from meaningful reduction in the error rates that could ultimately lead to an undermining
of the program’s support and ultimate reduction or elimination.18
The backfire risk that Zelenak posits is a significant cause for concern among those,
myself included, who believe that the low-cost high participation benefits of the tax-based
administration of the EITC are significant and worth maintaining.19 This article considers further
the hybrid nature of the EITC, and argues that as a starting point in compliance efforts, the
government should consider strategies that are less likely to require significant administrative
costs or decrease participation among eligible participants. To that end, the government should
shift additional compliance costs onto commercial tax return preparers, who play a significant
role in the EITC’s delivery. Part II of the article examines the basic structure of the EITC, as well
18 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1915-16 (2005); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform,
108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 589 (1995) (noting strong public and political reaction to error rates makes it improbable
that there will be an acceptance of high EITC error rates).
19 Delivering benefits through the tax system is also less stigmatizing than traditional welfare programs that are
dependent upon often difficult and costly in-person pre-eligibility screening processes. For a possible framework
evaluating the tradeoff between errors and participation, see David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of
Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1011 (2004) (considering such factors as the characteristics as
those receiving overpayments and the social costs to those who do not participate). Like Zelenak, in comparing the
food stamp program to the EITC, Weisbach and Nussim conclude that the EITC’s pattern of errors is preferable.
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1011
(2004). In addition to high participation and low direct costs, transferring benefits through the tax system rather than
through traditional welfare administration is thought to be less stigmatizing. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned
Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995).
6as providing an overview of the program’s compliance problem and the use of commercial tax
return preparers. Part III explores the EITC’s welfare and tax characteristics, and analyzes
Professor Zelenak’s article further. Part IV reveals that how the particular tax characteristics of
the EITC, namely little discretion in eligibility and the presence of the marketplace in assisting
with the delivery of the benefits, suggest prescriptive policies that will not compromise the
benefits of the tax system’s administration of the EITC. In Part V, building on the understanding
of the tax characteristics of administering the EITC and the likely causes of errors attributable to
commercially prepared returns, I argue that policymakers should focus on shifting additional
compliance costs to commercial return preparers in the form of heightened due diligence rules.
II. The EITC: The Basics, the Noncompliance Problem and the Use of Commercial
Preparers
A. Summary of the EITC
The EITC provides a refundable credit for low-income working claimants. Originally
enacted in 1975 as an offset to Social Security taxes and to provide an incentive to work, it has
been expanded significantly since inception. The credit provides a substantial benefit to 21
million Americans, with over $38 billion claimed in 2003 and almost 88 percent refunded
directly to claimants, and an average amount claimed of $1,788.20
The amount of the EITC depends on earned income and the presence of up to two
qualifying children who satisfy residency,21 relationship22 and age23 requirements. The credit
20 Berube, The New Safety Net, supra n. 2 at 1.
21 I.R.C. § 32(c) (requiring that qualifying child live in the United States with the taxpayer for more than half the
year).
22 I.R.C. § 32(c) (requiring that qualifying child be a son; daughter; stepchild; eligible foster child; a descendant of a
son, daughter, stepchild, eligible foster child; brother; sister; half brother; half sister; stepbrother; stepsister; or a
descendant of a brother, sister, half brother, half sister, stepbrother or a stepsister).
23 I.R.C. § 32(c) (requiring that qualifying child is under the age of 19 or under the age of 24 and a student or
permanently and totally disabled at any time during the year, regardless of age).
7amount is based upon a percentage of the claimant’s income,24 with a ceiling that varies by filing
status and the number of qualifying children, though there is no additional benefit for more than
two qualifying children. To help target the EITC to the poor or near poor, claimants with excess
investment income are not eligible,25 and married claimants cannot file separately.26
The following table illustrates the value of the EITC, according to income and the
presence of up to two qualifying children:
24 I.R.C. §§ 32(a), (b). The amount is indexed to account for inflation. I.R.C. § 32(j). This is a complex calculation,
and the IRS publishes annual tables to help with this computation. See IRS Publication 596, Earned Income Credit
Appendix (2005 Earned Income Credit Table).
25 I.R.C. § 32(i) (denying the EITC for individuals with excessive investment income). The limitation is indexed for
inflation. I.R.C. § 32(j). For 2005, the maximal amount of investment income is $2700. IRS Publication 596 p. 8.
26 I.R.C. § 32(d). In addition, to ensure that the benefit does not accrue to undocumented workers, the taxpayer and
the children claimed must have Social Security numbers valid for employment in the United States. I.R.C. § 32(m).
8B. The Overclaim Problem
1. What We Know
A significant number of people who file returns purporting to be eligible for EITC
benefits are not in fact eligible or are unable to demonstrate eligibility. In a study of EITC
claims from 1999, of about 18.8 million tax returns with approximately $31.3 billion in claims,
the IRS estimated that between $9.7 billion and $11.1 billion of EITC claims were erroneous.27
IRS enforcement activities prevented or recovered approximately $1.2 billion in improper
claims. Thus, using upper range estimates, the IRS should not have paid approximately $9.9
billion of the claims. Analysis of tax year 1999 compliance data shows that 80 percent of the
overclaims and 75 percent of overclaim dollars are attributable to three types of errors.28 These
included: (1) approximately $3 billion to qualifying child errors on 1.6 million returns; (2)
approximately $2 billion to filing status errors on 1.3 million returns; and (3) approximately $1.9
billion to income misreporting errors on 3.6 million returns.29
The most common qualifying child error was claiming a child who did not live with the
taxpayer for over half the taxable year and therefore did not satisfy the residency requirement.30
Another common qualifying error was claiming a child who did not meet the necessary
27 IRS, Compliance Estimates for Earned Income Tax Credit Claimed on 1999 Returns (2002) (noncompliance
range is attributable to differing assumptions for those claimants who did not respond to the IRS compliance study).
Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
148, 163 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
28 Internal Revenue Service, EITC Reform Initiative, FS-2004-14, June 2003,
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110296.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
29 Internal Revenue Service, EITC Reform Initiative, FS-2004-14, June 2003,
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110296.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
30 Internal Revenue Service, Announcement 2003-40, Administration of the Earned Income Credit,
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110298,00.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
9relationship test to the taxpayer.31 There was much overlap among the common errors, as most
who did not meet the relationship requirement also did not meet the residency requirement.32
In response to the persistent noncompliance problem, Congress and the IRS have
undertaken a far-reaching and at times radical approach to the problem. Congress has authorized
over a special appropriation of approximately $150 million per year over a five-year period to
combat EITC errors.33 While there have been significant legislative and administrative efforts to
reduce noncompliance,34 recent IRS studies indicate that the compliance rates for the EITC are
not substantially different from those for 1999, the last major EITC compliance review.35
2. What We Do Not Know
Even though the IRS has studied and reported on EITC noncompliance in four separate
studies in the past fifteen year, there is very little data relating to how much EITC
noncompliance relates to intentional conduct and how much relates to unintentional error. A
sometimes quoted study pegs the intentional EITC noncompliance rate at about 30 percent;36 IRS
31 Internal Revenue Service, Announcement 2003-40, Administration of the Earned Income Credit,
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110298,00.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
32 Internal Revenue Service, Announcement 2003-40, Administration of the Earned Income Credit,
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110298,00.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
33 Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
148, 161 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
34 Those efforts have included tightening the definition of qualifying child so that only children or are blood
relatives or placed with a claimant by a state authorized placement agency can potentially qualify, simplifying tie-
breaker rules so that it is less likely that claimants would inadvertently claim an illegible child, applying filters to
electronically filed returns, creating a Dependent Database from the Federal Case Registry of Child Support Orders
to identify possibly erroneous qualifying child claims from claimants who are less likely to be custodial parents,
imposing potentially draconian civil disallowance penalties on claimants who erroneously claim qualifying children,
imposing due diligence requirements on commercial preparers who prepare and file returns where an EITC is
claimed, the use of summary math disallowance procedures when claimants who have previously had their EITC
disallowed in audit file a subsequent return claiming the EITC without appropriate additional proof with the return,
and criminal investigation of commercial preparers suspected of fraudulently preparing EITC claimants’ returns.
35 See IRS, IRS Earned Income Tax Credit Initiative, 3 (Oct. 2005) (noting that preliminary data from the 2001
taxable year reflects estimates that are not substantially different from the 1999 study, but noting that some of the
compliance initiatives were not in place in 2001).
36 See Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Dept. of Treasury, Administrative Issues with Low Income Filers, 29
(2002) (noting the difficulty the IRS has in evaluating taxpayer intent in its EITC compliance studies). Using data
from the 1980s, Liebman estimates that at least 32% of EITC overclaims are attributable to intentional taxpayer
behavior. Id.
10
estimates considered the intentional error rate closer to 50 percent, but one thoughtful observer
commenting on the 50 percent estimate doubted its accuracy and stated that “it is virtually
impossible to distinguish taxpayer confusion from intentional misreporting.”37
Part of the challenges that the government faces with respect to reducing the EITC error
rate is that while the government has data on the elements that claimants are unable to satisfy,
there is little understanding of the underlying nature of the noncompliance. Sociologists have
identified various types of noncompliance, helping focus on the underlying causes of the error,
rather than just what legal element was unsatisfied.38
Writing about tax noncompliance generally, sociologists Robert Kidder and Craig
McEwen identified a typology of noncompliance to help identify the underlying nature of
noncompliance.39 Kidder and McEwen argue that noncompliance is best understood when one
considers the complex interaction between taxpayers and the tax system, with the result that even
broad categories like intentional and unintentional are insufficient to understand fully the
dynamics of noncompliance. In an article in the Kansas Law Review, I applied the Kidder and
McEwen typology to what little we know of the nature of EITC noncompliance. In looking at
EITC noncompliance, I argue that it is likely that there is likely not one compliance problem, but
a series of sometimes distinct compliance problems that calls for a more focused but still
multifaceted approach to reflect specific types of noncompliance problems.
37 See Janet McCubbin, EITC Compliance: the Misreporting of Children and the Size of the EITC, 6 (1999),
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/jopovw/132.html.
38 I have written on this previously, applying the work of sociologists Robert Kidder and Craig McEewen. Leslie
Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1145 (2003), citing Kidder and
McEewen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, 2
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 57 (1989).
39See Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of Tax
Compliance and Noncompliance, 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 47 (1989). Kidder and McEwen categorized
noncompliance in terms of procedural noncompliance, lazy noncompliance, unknowing noncompliance, brokered
noncompliance, symbolic noncompliance, social noncompliance, and habitual noncompliance. I briefly discuss lazy
and unknowing noncompliance below. For an application of the other categories in the EITC context, see Leslie
Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1145 (2003).
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Determining the underlying causes of the error is crucial, because government action
should vary depending on what truly inspired the error. For example, for low-income taxpayers, I
believe, based upon my experience in representing many taxpayers in a low-income clinic, that
procedural noncompliance (errors relating to administrative complexity), unknowing
noncompliance (inadvertent errors that claimants themselves make) and brokered noncompliance
(errors facilitated by unscrupulous or ignorant return preparers), are significant factors in the
overclaim rate. Understanding the underlying causes of noncompliance helps the government
tailor an appropriate response, as well as facilitating a discussion as to whether the government
should focus its resources on particular types of noncompliance.40
3. The Role of Paid Preparers
The Kidder and McEwen typology as applied to low-income taxpayers is helpful, for it
allows a clearer look at what the government can do to reduce particular types of noncompliance.
Importantly, government responses to some types of noncompliance will be ineffective or
perhaps even counterproductive with other types of noncompliance.41 Given that EITC claiming
taxpayers disproportionately rely on paid preparers to prepare and file their EITC claims,42
brokered noncompliance is especially important for EITC-claiming taxpayers. Understanding the
relationship of paid preparers to the EITC compliance problem is crucial.
40 See GAO, Tax Compliance: Better Compliance Data and Long-Term Goals Would Support a More Strategic IRS
Approach to Reducing the Tax Gap, 17-18GAO-05-753 (July 2005).
41 See Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1145, 1186 (2003)
(discussing how Congressional efforts to reduce the possibility EITC program error increased the perceived injustice
of the EITC, especially for unmarried household partners with the working partner not the biological parent of a
minor child).
42 See infra at [ ]
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As the GAO recently reported, many American taxpayers view completing and filing a
tax return as a “daunting task.”43 People use tax preparers for many reasons, including because
they do not understand the tax laws; they lack time and patience to complete the forms; or they
hoped to obtain a larger or faster refund through a preparer.44 In 2001, for lower-income EITC-
claiming taxpayers, the percentage of taxpayers who paid someone to prepare their returns is
higher than that of non-EITC claimants, with approximately 68 percent having used paid
preparers, compared to 59.4 percent of the general population.45 In addition to the complexity of
tax returns claiming an EITC, reasons why low-income taxpayers are particularly likely to use a
preparer include limited literacy skills, language barriers and the promise of faster refunds
through access to electronic filing or loans facilitated by preparers.46
The cost of return preparation, although paid by EITC recipients, is properly viewed as a
hidden administrative cost of the EITC program. Perhaps these preparers offer a productive way
43 GAO, Most Taxpayers Believe They Benefit from Paid Tax Preparers, But Oversight for IRS is a Challenge,
GAO-04-70 1 (Oct. 2003).
44 GAO, Most Taxpayers Believe They Benefit from Paid Tax Preparers, But Oversight for IRS is a Challenge,
GAO-04-70 7-8 (Oct. 2003).
45 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS AND PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT [hereinafter PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS], 4 (Aug. 8, 2003). Recent data more specifically identifies
the distribution ranges of EITC applicants who use paid preparers.
The use of commercial preparers among EITC claimants is increasing. Alan Berube, The New Safety Net,
Brookings Inst., 8 (Feb. 2006) (increase in proportion of EITC claimants who use paid preparers to 71 percent in
2003). Berube notes that lower-income non-EITC claimants used commercial preparers at the much lower rate of 52
percent. Id. at 8.
46See, e.g., Francine Lipman, The Working Poor are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-
Poverty Purse, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 461, 472 (2003). These loans are secured by the anticipated refund.
13
to use private markets to improve social service delivery, but the economic effect of the fees they
charge is a reduction in net EITC benefits received.47
For those unfamiliar with the tax system it is sometimes surprising that there are no
minimum national qualifications applicable for those wishing to prepare federal tax returns. As
the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) recently testified, before the 1990s’ expansion of the
EITC, the vast majority of return preparers were Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) or
attorneys subject to state licensing, and often to a continuing education requirement, or enrolled
agents, who are in the business of preparing tax returns, and must pass a rigorous IRS-
administered examination and complete 16 hours of continuing professional education every
year.48 However, as the NTA testified, with the boost in the EITC and the advent of electronic
tax return filing that facilitated preparers’ arrangements for taxpayers to receive almost
instantaneous loans monetized by the refunds, a new class of preparers has emerged -- one that is
not engaged primarily in the business of preparing taxes. Rather, these preparers use tax
preparation as a means to attract customers for some other product or service they offer that is
unrelated to return preparation or even financial or tax planning. These products include check
cashing, automobile sales, sale of pawned items [or “pawn services”], furniture rentals, and even
-- through the use of payday-type loans issued on debit cards that are honored at only a few
locations -- the provision of general household necessities that are sold at grossly inflated prices
during the filing season.49 For these preparers, unlike the CPAs, attorneys, or enrolled preparers,
there is no benchmark to evaluate their competency. Furthermore, even if competence were not
47 Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 533, 590 (1995). See the discussion, infra, at II. D regarding the importance of insights from the field of
behavioral economics in respect of lower-income taxpayer use of commercial preparers.
48 National Taxpayer Advocate, July 20, 2005, Testimony Before House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee.
49 Statement of Nina Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Internal Revenue Service, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means (July 20, 2005).
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at issue, the tax system creates incentives for preparers to overstate refunds, especially if the
preparers’ profits depend, in part on selling services or products that taxpayers will purchase
with their EITC-generated refund.
Recent studies indicate that a significant amount of EITC overclaims is associated with
returns that commercial preparers prepare. Of the approximately $11 billion in upper range
estimated erroneous EITC claims made in 1999, approximately 57 percent of the overclaims was
attributable to returns prepared by commercial return preparers. The overall error rate among
taxpayers identifying themselves as using a preparer is 34.6 percent, compared with 37.8 percent
among those who did not identify a paid preparer.50 There are significant variations in the error
rate among the different type of preparers. In 1999, approximately 31 percent of claimants had
their return prepared by a CPA, attorney or a nationally recognized preparation service, and
among those, about 25 percent of the EITC was claimed in error. Among the 35.2 percent of the
claimants using other commercial preparers, the error rate was much higher, at 36.2 percent.51
The presence of the EITC-generated refund, and the ability to monetize the anticipated
refund immediately (and thus pay the preparation and related costs), contributes to the presence
of both the national marketplace leaders like H & R Block and others, as well as local “mom and
pop” storefront preparers who often are not enrolled agents or accountants, but who are self-
employed or working for smaller local firms. It is unclear why among classes of preparers there
is a difference in error rates—whether it is attributable to the preparers’ skills or scruples, or the
client characteristics of those using the different preparer types.52
50 Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
148, 170 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
51 Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
148, 171 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
52 Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
148, 171 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
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D. Simplification: The Silver Bullet for Reducing Low Income Taxpayer Use of
Preparers?
Given that low income EITC claimants saw approximately 20 percent of their claimed
EITC benefits go toward tax return preparation costs and ancillary services and products in
recent years, some who have analyzed the high incidence of preparers among low income
taxpayers have recommended that simplifying the tax law generally and the EITC specifically
would result in less use of commercial preparers.53 What follows is a brief consideration of the
factors that contribute to EITC claimants’ use of preparers, with an analysis of the likely sticky
nature of claimants’ use of those preparers. Two of the most discussed simplification proposals
for the EITC are combining the EITC with other family-related benefit provisions,54 such as the
child tax credit and dependency exemptions, and the plan by Professors Yin and Forman to
replace the EITC with an exemption from the employee’s share of social security taxes up until
the first $5,000 or $10,000 in wages.55
Simplifying the tax code, especially for taxpayers who are the least sophisticated and
most likely to suffer from literacy and language barriers, intuitively seems like good policy.
While, like baseball and apple pie, it is hard to oppose simplification, I am skeptical that
simplification will have a significant effect on the use of paid preparers. For many lower to
53 Michael O’Connor, Tax Preparation Services for Lower-Income Filers: A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 90
TAX NOTES 231, 232-37 (2001); Francine Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing
the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 461, 476 (2003); ; Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21
YALE J. ON REG. 121, 175 (“first, and most importantly, Treasury and Congress need to continue efforts to simplify
the EITC”).
54 Robert Cherry & Max Sawicki, Giving Tax Credit Where Credit is Due: A Universal Unified Child Credit that
Expands the EITC and Cuts Taxes for Working Families, The Economic Policy Institute,
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_eitc (Apr. 2000). Recent legislation provides a more uniform
definition of qualifying children for purposes of the related family status benefits’ provisions, but it does not unify
the refundable nature of the child tax credit and earned income tax credit. Tax Administration Good Government
Act, S. 882, 108th Cong. § 501-508 (2004).
55 George K. Yin, et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned
Income Tax Credit Program, 1 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225 (1994). The exemption proposal would also provide a
universally available refundable family allowance credit based upon the number of children residing in the
household and would not be dependent on income or employment status.
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moderate-wage workers, tax time is not about the pain of paying, but the benefits of obtaining
refunds occasioned by excess withholdings and refundable credits like the earned income tax
credit. Rather than view preparation fees as costs, taxpayers, especially financially
unsophisticated taxpayers, view refunds as money they never had anyway.56 While costs are not
irrelevant, taxpayers likely view preparation, and associated fees like refund anticipation loans
(RALs) and check-cashing fees, quite differently than costs they would have to incur on top of
additional tax liabilities that are paid to the government.
Thus, I believe it is not complexity per se that increases the likelihood that taxpayers will
and do use paid preparers and their ancillary services, but that the use of paid preparers is closely
tied to taxpayers’ receipt tax benefits in a lump sum following the filing of a tax return. If
payments or benefits were evenly spread during the year, at tax-return filing time, people would
be forced to reach into their pockets and spend money that they already had separately accounted
for. Rather than view tax preparation costs as a reduced gain, if the government spread payments
evenly,57 filers would likely view those preparation costs as losses, and given individuals’
general aversion to losses,58 would likely be much more sensitive to the costs inherent in return
preparation. Moreover, removing or reducing the lump sum nature of the refundable aspect of
the tax benefits removes the reason taxpayers seek RALs in the first place, i.e., they will not need
to get money back but will have already enjoyed the benefit of the money over the period in
which either their wages are exempt from withholding taxes or credits were being paid.
56 E.g., Chris O’Malley, Loans for Tax Refunds Can Be Quite Costly, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 14, 2004, at D1
(referring to one preparer noting that Americans’ craving for instant benefits combined with their belief that the
refund was money they never had produces an intense demand for tax preparation services).
57 There is the possibility to receive a potion of the EITC in advance, but it is seldom used. IRC Sec.3507.
58 DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES 473, 481-83 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
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Research from the field of behavioral economics supports the insight that the nature of
the payment rather than the complexity is the driving force to taxpayer use of costly preparation
services. For example, people respond differently to the same situation, depending on whether it
is explained, or “framed,” as a potential gain or a potential loss.59 Further, Richard Thaler
suggests that the loss function of framing is steeper than the gain function.60 This means that
people are more sensitive to losing something they already own than they are to gaining the same
item.61 Therefore, when taxpayers view refunds as money they are gaining, rather than
something they already had, they will be less concerned about losing some of that money to fee
payments and high interest rates. However, if taxpayers were able to view RALs and fees as
losses, they probably would be more likely to avoid them, and be less inclined to take out costly
RALs.
Even if Congress did not adopt simplification that eliminated or reduced the lump sum
nature of the EITC, the insight from law and behavioral economics does not, however, eliminate
other policy reasons to favor other simplification proposals. There may be valid policy reasons
for simplifying or unifying family status benefit provisions, including that it might limit the work
disincentives inherent in the benefit reduction formulas under current law62 and that it would
59 Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193,
1235 (1994). For example, suppose there are two gas stations across the street from each other. Both have prices of
$1.55 for paying with a credit card, and $1.45 for paying with cash. The first gas station frames the advertisement as
a potential gain with a sign that reads, “DISCOUNT FOR PAYING CASH!” The second gas station simply puts up
a sign in tiny print that reads “credit card surcharge.” Because the first gas station is framed as a potential gain,
people are more likely to go to that gas station, even though the prices are exactly the same. This illustrates the
human aversion to loss. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS, 65 (Ecco. 2004). For
more examples, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 343
(1984).
60 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 739-740 (1999).
61 Id.
62 Lee A. Sheppard, Making the EITC More European, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 220-3 (Nov. 13, 2002); see also
Gene Steuerle, Combining Child Credits, the EITC, and the Dependant Exemption: First of Two Parts: Is a New
Momentum Being Created?, 87 TAX NOTES 567 (Apr. 24, 2000); Gene Steuerle, Combining Child Credits, the
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likely contribute to greater taxpayer understanding of the benefits they are receiving. The greater
understanding of the provisions would likely reduce the number of unintentional mistakes that
taxpayers or preparers make, which could reduce the EITC error rate. Nonetheless,
simplification, if not backstopped by an increased likelihood that taxpayers will not receive the
benefit of the refundable nature of the proposals in a lump sum, will likely not lead to significant
reductions in the use of paid preparers, and especially pricey services such as RALs.
While the use of RALs might decrease with wholesale simplification accompanied by a
more even distribution of benefits, there are other factors that would still result in significant use
paid preparers and incur preparation costs even if Congress were to adopt wholesale
simplification backstopped by an even distribution of tax benefits. First, many lower-wage
workers suffer from significant literacy and language barriers63 that might prevent them from
preparing an appropriate tax return, even if the benefits were much more understandable and
based on uniform standards. Moreover, data suggests that the people who claim refundable
credits vary significantly from year-to-year. For example, nearly 30 percent of EITC claimants
in 2001 were different from those who claimed the credit in 2000.64 This flux in the EITC-
claimant pool combined with the generally low literacy and financial sophistication skills of
lower-income taxpayers suggests that there will likely continue to be a robust market for paid
preparers to complete and file the appropriate tax return, as new entrants will be less likely to
benefit from the simplification benefits and less willing to self-prepare and file a tax return.
EITC, and the Dependant Exemption: Part Two of Two Parts: The Various Rationales, 87 TAX NOTES 703 (May 1,
2000).
63 Michael O’Connor, Tax Preparation Services for Lower-Income Filers: A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 90
TAX NOTES 231, 232-37 (2001) (describing a literacy study, which found that “46 to 51 percent of the nation's adult
population lack the most basic skills to prepare a tax return”).
64 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS AND PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT, 3 (Aug. 8, 2003).
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Given the above, I believe it is highly likely that commercial return preparers will
continue to remain an important part of the landscape for lower-income taxpayers and EITC
claimants in particular.
III. The EITC’s Welfare and Tax Characteristics
A. The EITC—Fish or Fowl?
One way to consider the government’s efforts at administering the EITC is a growing
awareness that the EITC is performing distributive functions previously the domain of other
programs and agencies. Faced with the task of delivering benefits, rather than collecting taxes,
the IRS has looked at administration of other benefits programs in an effort to assist it with some
of the challenges associated with delivering benefits through the tax system.
The dramatic expansion in the 1990s of the EITC is often understood as a component to
welfare reform.65 Congress expanded the EITC to both attract and retain former welfare
recipients in the labor market. To understand the EITC as part and parcel of welfare reform has
serious policy implications. Its bipartisan support66 is on less stable grounds when the EITC is
within welfare’s shadow. To be sure, the analogy between welfare and the EITC is far from
perfect. As Professor Alstott noted, traditional welfare programs provided little benefit to the
working poor.67 Unlike the EITC, which varies with the amount of earned income, traditional
benefits programs focused largely on those without earned income.68 Moreover, there are other
key distinctions, given that EITC recipients do not “fit the traditional definition of welfare
65 Jason DeParle, A War on Poverty Subtly Linked to Race, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000 at A1 (noting how President
Clinton viewed the growth of the EITC as an essential component of welfare reform); Gene Steurle, Summers on
Social Tax Expenditures, 89 Tax Notes 1481 (Dec. 11, 2000) (noting that welfare reform “would not have been
possible without the supports provided by the EITC and some other programs.”).
66 IRS, IRS Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Initiative, 3 (Oct. 2005) (noting the tradition bipartisan support for
the EITC).
67 Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533
[ ] (1995)
68 Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 533 (1995).
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recipients,”69 the political poison that is usually associated with the racial and gender undertones
associated with discussions of welfare, 70 and the annual lump-sum nature of the EITC which
makes it less helpful than other benefits for relief from short-term crises.71 Yet, while not a
perfect analogy, the debate about the EITC is now often couched in terms similar to that
revolving around welfare policy.
An important context for any discussion about the EITC is one’s frame of reference for
looking at the issues of error rates and claimant costs. Considering the program in the context of
overall tax noncompliance, EITC noncompliance does not seem that bad. After all, the EITC is a
relatively small part of the total tax gap.72 Moreover, there are other more costly areas of
systemic noncompliance (like income and deductions from sole proprietorships and the use of
offshore accounts and entities to hide income from Uncle Sam),73 and scarce IRS compliance
69 See Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 757, 793 (2005).
When people refer to “welfare,” they typically mean the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which
aided mostly single mothers and their children, or its replacement, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Id.
70 See Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 757 (2005) (citing
Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction of Poverty: Welfare Reform in American 159, 160
(1991) (“Because the EITC does not apply to most welfare mothers – those who do not earn, those who are most
stigmatized – it escapes much of the debate over the domestic code, and it is generally devoid of the gender and
racial undertones that have beset much of the controversy on AFDC.”); see also, Brown, supra note ##, at 760-61
(discussing the racial overtones associated with EITC and showing how many EITC beneficiaries are actually white
families). “[T]he public perception of welfare is raced black. Therefore, whenever EITC recipients are compared to
welfare recipients, there is a racial overtone – whether or not one was intended.” Id. Professor Brown attempts to
break some of the misperceptions surrounding race and the EITC “Whites are more likely than Blacks to be eligible
for the EITC – in fact, the EITC-eligible pool includes twice as many Whites as Blacks.” Id. at 839.
71 Jennifer L. Romich & Thomas Weisner, How Families View and Use the EITC: Advance Payment versus Lump
Sum Delivery, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1245, 1258 (2000) (discussing how the behavioral life cycle theory suggests that
people are likely to spend money from different mental accounts on different things; “wealth,” such as tax money,
along with the EITC, is more likely to be spend on large-ticket items, while current income or evenly distributed
benefits are likely spent on everyday needs and consumption).
72 Recent compliance estimates for the 2001 year peg an 85 percent voluntary compliance rate, with a $257-298
billion net tax gap (tax not collected due to nonfiling, underreporting and nonpayment). See GAO, “Tax
Compliance: Opportunities Exist to Reduce the Tax Gap Using a Variety of Approaches, GAO-06-1000T 4-5 (July
2006). Most recent estimates suggest that the net tax gap attributable to the EITC is approximately $ 9.9 billion.
Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1885 (2005).
73 For example, recent estimates peg the tax gap attributable to underreporting of income attributable to (i) non-farm
sole proprietor to be in the range of $59 to $65 billion and (ii) certain flow-through entities (partnerships and S-
corporations) to be between $16 and $24 billion. See GAO, “Tax Compliance: Opportunities Exist to Reduce the
Tax Gap Using a Variety of Approaches, GAO-06-1000T 10-11 (July 2006).
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resources often get a bigger bang for their buck when directed at those other problem areas.74
Considering EITC errors in light of other benefits’ programs, however, is a different story. EITC
error rates are excessive—almost five times the error rates than in the food stamp program, for
example.
B. The Hybrid Aspects of the EITC
One approach to the EITC’s compliance problems then is to decide what the EITC is – is
it a tax program or a welfare program? Once defining its essence, then perhaps policy
prescriptions should flow.75 Having set this context, I confess to believing that these
perspectives should be less important to the policy choices facing EITC administration. The
perspectives-based analysis contributes to a more formalistic approach to policy consideration.76
Understanding the tax or welfare pedigree of the EITC does not lead necessarily to policy
decisions. It also fails to reflect the truly hybrid nature of the EITC, with almost 88 percent of it
refunded to claimants, with the balance applied to income taxes (and a significant amount also to
employment taxes). Neither fish nor fowl, the EITC is part welfare, part tax credit.
In a recent article, Professor Lawrence Zelenak considers the hybrid tax/welfare nature of
the EITC. Zelenak’s initial insight is that the EITC is more a welfare program in economic
effect but a tax program in administration. He considers the recent controversy over the
appropriate level of government enforcement efforts as a consequence of its status as a hybrid
tax/welfare program. Compared to other tax benefits, where self-declared eligibility is the norm,
74 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1898-99 (2005).
75 Many advocates take this approach. See, e.g., Janet Spragens, The EITC Certification Initiative Should be
Stopped, 24 ABA Tax Section News, Quarterly 2005 10 (Summer 2005).
76 Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 10-12 (1985) (criticizing the historical approach to
due process as relying on arguments by analogy than can dull the merits of perspective choices).
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and there is a sense of rough justice in which the system emphasizes efficiency over accuracy,77
Zelenak notes that government EITC compliance efforts are intense. Compared to other welfare
benefits, however, where universal pre-screening eligibility is the norm, the level of government
enforcement is actually low.
To back his descriptive claim, Zelenak looks at the practices and attitudes associated with
tax and welfare enforcement. First, he examines the controversy surrounding pre-certification for
benefits. He notes that for most EITC claimants, claimants self-declare eligibility, with the
transfer of the EITC dependent solely on filing the appropriate tax return and accompanying
schedules. The exception to pure self-eligibility is found in the IRS’s auditing, certification,
math error and pre-certification programs. Looking at all of those compliance programs, only
about 10 percent of EITC claimants are required to establish eligibility prior to its receipt. In
contrast, Zelenak notes that establishing eligibility prior to receiving food stamp and welfare
benefits is the “core” of those programs. Applicants often have pre-benefit face-to-face meetings
with caseworkers, verification of eligibility, and recertification following an initial benefits
period.78
Zelenak draws the obvious but important conclusion that requiring pre-certification will
result in fewer overpayments than will self-declared eligibility.79 From this, he concludes that
the different approaches toward pre-certification under the EITC (limited), nonrefundable tax
credits (almost none), and welfare (universal pre-certification), reflect that “[c]ongressional
77 For more on the notion of rough justice that characterizes the American tax system, see Ann Mumford, Taxing
Culture: Towards a Theory of Tax Collection Law, 38-40 (2002).
78 For more on the pre-benefits’ eligibility review and certification procedures, see Note, The Doorkeeper and the
Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification in Means-tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 663 (2005).
79 Following Zelenak’s article, the IRS published results of its initial certification pilot, comparing a test group and
control group of 25,000 each. See IRS Earned Income Tax Credit Initiative (Oct. 2005) (test results that certification
of eligibility reduced EITC claims by approximately 10 percent and also had an effect on preventing the payment of
erroneous claims for cases where the EITC was requested but the individual was unable to establish the residency of
the qualifying children).
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tolerance for overpayments is greatest for overpayment of tax benefits, least for overpayment of
welfare programs and somewhere in between but closer to the tax end of the spectrum-for
overpayment of the EITC.”80
To buttress his claim that Congress treats errors with the EITC as somewhat in between
welfare and tax errors, Zelenak looks at other kinds of evidence. For example, Zelenak looks at
the administrative costs as a percentage of program benefits, with the assumption that the higher
the ratio of costs to benefits indicates low tolerance for overpayments. Zelenak notes that there
are relatively high administrative costs associated with food stamps and welfare, with
administrative cost associated with food stamps at approximately 20 to 25 percent of program
benefits and welfare at 10 percent of program benefits. While there is little data on how much the
IRS spends directly on EITC administration, costs as a percentage of benefits are no more than
1.85 percent and are likely much less than that.81 Looking at the IRS’s audits of EITC claimants
compared to other returns, Zelenak likewise notes that EITC returns are several times more
likely to be selected for audit. Zelenak considers the percentage of the IRS’s enforcement budget
devoted to the EITC in relation to enforcement resources directed toward the rest of the tax gap.
Using that barometer, Zelenak notes that in 2003 the IRS dedicated about 3.8 percent of its
enforcement dollars to the EITC, while the EITC only accounted for about 2.8 percent of the tax
gap. This “suggests that the IRS overemphasizes EITC enforcement relative to other tax
enforcement issues, but only moderately so.”82
80 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1881 (2005).
81 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1884 (2005); see also Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX
ADMINISTRATION 148, 161 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (noting that the special appropriation to
reduce EITC noncompliance is approximately .5 percent of the 2001 tax year EITC claims, and that it is likely that
the other costs relating to administering the EITC do not exceed 1 percent).
82 Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1885 (2005). He rightly notes that the rational tax administrator would consider a cost-benefit analysis, and “attempt
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Other evidence supports Zelenak’s claim that welfare overpayments are more
objectionable than excessive tax reductions, and that the EITC overpayments are viewed as an
intermediate case. The ratio of underpayments to overpayments is illustrative. While pre-
screening for eligibility and other compliance efforts are effective in reducing overpayments,
such efforts should also cause underpayments, both in terms of reduced benefits to eligible
participants and a lack of payments to eligible participants. For example, food stamp error rates
hover at around 6 percent, with underpayments approximating 30 percent, with the ratio of
underpayments to overpayments at about 5:1. Conversely, while there is little firm data on EITC
underpayments, using GAO data and recent IRS compliance studies Zelenak estimates that the
EITC features errors in favor of individuals that are larger than errors favorable to the
government as somewhere between 2 and 3:1. This estimate includes those not claiming EITCs
who are eligible. Looking at non EITC tax benefits, Zelenak estimates that the errors in favor of
the taxpayers exceeded errors in favor of the government somewhere in the neighborhood of
5:1.83
After his persuasive march through the evidence, and his compelling application of
Murphy and Nagel’s everyday libertarianism84 as an explanation as to why the government and
to equalize the marginal returns on enforcement dollars” and attempt to produce the same amount of revenue from
the last dollar spent on EITC as on other issues. He notes, however, that there is little data that integrates both the
direct and indirect effects of compliance efforts, while the little data surrounding direct benefits suggests that the
IRS likewise suggests a slight overemphasis on the EITC. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration
of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1886 (2005).
83 Zelenak backs his conclusions with further evidence, looking at the IRS’s relative lack of criminal prosecutions
and limited use of civil penalties in connection with EITC errors compared with food stamps and welfare
prosecutions and penalties, and the OMB’s failure to classify any IRS administered noncompliance problem as
within the jurisdiction of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2000, except the EITC. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax
or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1898-1900 (2005).
84 The theory of everyday libertarianism posits that people believe that they earn their money without government
assistance; as such, in the compliance context, people are less concerned with those who fail to pay taxes on income
they earned (as that money is still seen somewhat as the earner’s own money), while views on overpayments of
welfare are negative, because those overpayments reflect “the wrongful taking of the pretax income of others, and as
such it is an unmitigated wrong.” Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax
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the public view welfare errors as worse than EITC noncompliance,85 Zelenak strikes a pragmatic
conclusion. If total administrative costs are to be viewed as the sum of direct administrative costs
and benefit overpayments, then tax-based administration of the EITC and welfare-based
administration of food stamps are “very similar.” If one concludes, as Zelenak does, that it is
better to spend money on benefits for the nearly eligible rather than burn money on direct
administrative costs,86 then the EITC cost pattern is preferable to non-IRS administered benefits’
programs. Pointing out that the EITC’s existence is possibly fragile, and that how even with the
IRS’s stepped up compliance efforts over the past decade, the IRS’s enforcement efforts place
the EITC as more similar to ordinary tax enforcement than welfare-type enforcement, Zelenak
cautions advocates from objecting too strenuously to EITC enforcement actions:
Vociferous objections could easily backfire, in either of two ways. First, the
objections might lead Congress to reject the EITC as tax analogy in favor of the
EITC as welfare analogy, and to transfer the program to welfare bureaucracy (or
keep the program within the IRS but require universal precertification) Second,
Congress might initially defer to the objections and refrain from special EITC
compliance initiatives, only to decide that the level of noncompliance was
unacceptable and that the entire credit should therefore be repealed.
The real surprise is not that the IRS overstates efforts at reducing EITC errors more than
excessive tax reductions; rather, that EITC recipients are not made to go through the eligibility
and verification gauntlet in the same manner as other benefits’ recipients. What is especially
insightful about Zelenak’s article is that it provides a basis for appreciating how good EITC
claimants have it, while it also applies a critical theoretical framework to the failure to treat
welfare overpayments as the same or even less objectionable than excessive tax reductions. Its
Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1902 (2005), applying Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s, The Myth of
Ownership: Taxes and Justice (2002) to issues pertaining to tax admionistration.
85 Zelenak also analyzes the history as to how the EITC developed in the way it did, suggesting that as the EITC
expanded to become more of a transfer program rather than a tax reduction, Congress reflexively retained self-
eligibility. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L.
REV. 1867, 1906-11 (2005).
86 Others have recently reached the same conclusion. David A Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax
and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1010-12 (2004).
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limitation, however, is that it does not provide a sufficient basis for the government to refine its
EITC compliance efforts, save for accepting almost anything that is less comprehensive or
burdensome than food stamp or welfare recipients are forced to endure.
This limitation is troubling, because the IRS is searching for guidance in this area,
claimants’ benefits hang in the balance, and the IRS’s efforts to reduce EITC errors attract a
firestorm of criticism that may have broader implications in terms of respect for the tax system.
Yet, Zelenak’s insights allow us to peel back how IRS compliance efforts can take advantage of
EITC’s placement in the tax system, and not reflect weaknesses associated with welfare
administration.
IV. Compliance Insights Attributable to an Understanding of the Hybrid Nature of the
EITC
The debate surrounding government efforts to reduce EITC noncompliance has suffered
from formalism. Critics of the IRS lament that the EITC compliance efforts are unfair compared
to other parts of the tax code, while the IRS emphasizes the EITC claimants’ relatively light
burdens, compared with recipients in other benefit programs. Nonetheless, it is worth exploring
the analogy a bit further, though not for the sake of defaulting to an approach just because it is
consistent with tax or welfare administration. Rather, the goal here is to understand ways in
which the differences between the EITC’s welfare and tax pedigrees reveal policy choices that
could assist with its administration and improve its delivery. As discussed below, there are two
key differences between the EITC that have implications for reducing the EITC’s error rate, the
lack of discretion associated with its eligibility and the presence of return preparers who prepare
and file tax returns for a fee.
A. The Lack of Discretion in EITC Eligibility
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Until the mid-1960s, caseworkers in welfare programs often had discretion over the
provision and cessation of welfare benefits.87 The 1960s era civil rights movement and the
upsurge in procedural protections following such landmark decisions as Goldberg v. Kelly88 saw
a decrease in caseworker discretion and an increase in formal protections and transparency for
welfare recipients.89 By the 1990s, there was a significant backlash against the formalism, with
the belief that discretionary provision of benefits would enhance flexibility and allow
caseworkers greater freedom to wean people off the dole and encourage work participation. As
such, the mid-1990s was accompanied by a paradigm shift in the way most people interacted
with welfare administrators. The 1996 welfare reform shifted the relationship between
beneficiaries and administrators, requiring beneficiaries to satisfy work requirements and face
time limitations on receipt.90 Moreover, many states have attempted to reduce the numbers of
participants by adopting diversionary programs where administrators funnel people away from
ongoing receipt of benefits and toward a lump-sum payment, and impose job-search
requirements while benefits’ applications are pending.91 Accompanying these changes is a return
to greater caseworker discretion and less public accountability among caseworkers reviewing
87 Barak Y. Orbach, Unwelcome Benefits: Why Welfare Beneficiaries Reject Government Aid, 24 LAW & INEQ.
107, 124 (2006).
88 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires hearing prior to termination of benefits received under federal program
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
89 Barak Y. Orbach, Unwelcome Benefits: Why Welfare Beneficiaries Reject Government Aid, 24 LAW & INEQ. 124
(2006); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 635,
639 (2000) (noting that there was an explosion in procedural innovation following Goldberg v. Kelly); Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975) (noting that after Goldberg, “[w]e have
witnessed a due process explosion in which the court has carried the hearing requirement from one new area of
government action to another”).
90 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2185, included work requirements and time limitations in an effort to stop what was perceived to be the endless
welfare cycle. See Joel Handler, The “Third Way” or the Old Way?, 48 KAN. L. REV. 765, 778 (2000) (detailing
changes to the welfare state in 1996, tying welfare to employment and enacting time limitations). The rhetoric
surrounding the debate over welfare reform in the 1990s focused on the traditional criticism that welfare encouraged
idleness. “It was believed that the primary cause of pauperism was the indiscriminate giving of aid which destroyed
the desire to work.” Id.
91 Matthew Diller, The Revolution In Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, And Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1147 (2000).
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benefit applications, which is an outgrowth of an attempt to incorporate private sector or
entrepreneurial techniques in the field of government administration. These private sector
techniques in welfare administration include funding incentives and performance-based
evaluation.92
The receipt of tax benefits stands in sharp contrast to the emerging post-welfare model of
benefits transfer, and is instead reminiscent of the period subsequent to the post-civil rights era
reform and prior to the mid-1990s welfare reform period. Receipt of the EITC, while dependent
upon individuals earning income, is largely based on satisfaction of detailed eligibility rules
relating to income and household composition that have little room for administrative
discretion.93 While the IRS may challenge EITC eligibility, individuals have administrative and
judicial appeal rights, rights meant to ensure that people can prove eligibility to detailed statutory
requirements that focus mostly on the presence of qualifying children in the taxpayer’s
household, the taxpayer’s proper filing status, and the correct amount of a taxpayer’s earned
income—variables that can affect eligibility for or the amount of an EITC. Unlike the in-person
interview accompanying most benefits applications and some renewals, IRS challenges to
eligibility are mostly accomplished through remote correspondence-based examinations that are
based almost solely on a consideration of detailed statutory rules.94 Discretion plays no part in
92 Matthew Diller, The Revolution In Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, And Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1176 (2000).
93 Effective for 2005, Congress has repealed the one subjective aspect of qualifying child eligibility, whether certain
children are cared for as the taxpayer’s own child. See P.L. 108-311 § 205. This subjective test only applied to a
limited class of children, namely those placed by an authorized placement agency or siblings or descendants of
siblings. 32(c)(3)(B)(iii), prior to the 2005 amendment.
94 Relative to the almost 100% rate of contact with the administrators on other benefits’ applications, IRS
correspondence audits touch few applicants; in TY 2001 there were 367,288 audits out of more than 19.5 million
taxpayers claiming the EITC. Yet this distinction in models between tax benefits and other benefits contributes to
the relative efficiencies of delivering benefits through the tax system. Department of the Treasury, Earned Income
Tax Credit Program Effectiveness and Program Management, 2 (Aug. 8, 2003); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or
Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1877 (2005) (noting that “in
recent years, the IRS has audited approximately 400,000 EITC claims annually”). Accordingly, an EITC audit is a
“correspondence audit,” which is generally conducted by mail. An audit is conducted before the EITC refund has
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determining the existence or the amount of the EITC, though the taxpayer’s lack of appropriate
evidence or documentation in the audit process can require administrators to exercise judgment
in determining satisfaction of eligibility criteria.
B. Paying for Your Tax Benefits
One’s starting point greatly effects how one views delivering benefits through the tax
system. In traditional welfare programs, applying for benefits does not produce significant direct
claimant costs, though there are indirect costs associated with acquiring the documentation
needed to establish eligibility and time spent on face--to face eligibility determinations with
caseworkers.95 As mentioned above, in the tax system, there is an active private market
component, both with respect to preparers and the sale of tax preparation software and
guidebooks.96
Professor Lipman notes that the marketplace serves a significant drain on the delivery of
benefits, with estimates from 2002 suggesting that of the $30 billion claimed, $1.7 billion was
been issued, and the refund is frozen until the pending audit is resolved. In TY 2002, the IRS conducted 367, 314
EITC correspondence audits, 5,970 EITC field audits, and 4,655 EITC office audits. Department of the Treasury,
Earned Income Tax Credit Program Effectiveness and Program Management, 2 (Aug. 8, 2003).
95 See Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1145, 1192 (2003)
(discussing the process involved in applying for food stamps). The average application for food stamps takes about
five hours of the applicant’s time, and costs him approximately $10.35 in out of pocket expenses. Recertifying one’s
eligibility takes about half the time as the original application process, and costs about $5.84. During the mid 1990s
an effort was made to increase recertification, and with that national food stamp participation fell. In 1998
participation dropped to around 50%, with 15% of eligible households claiming costs of participation as the most
important factor in their decision not to participate. Id.
96 See Paul J. Lim, So Much Software, But So Little Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 34 (discussing the barrage
of tax software infiltrating the private market). The private market has discovered a booming business opportunity
providing tax preparation alternatives tailored to fit the needs of various taxpayers. Tax preparation software such as
CCH CompleteTax, TaxACT, TaxCut and TurboTax promises taxpayers a stay-at-home way to sit back, relax and
file their taxes from their home computers. Moreover, there is a world of tax self-help guidebooks lying on the
shelves of bookstores spanning the country. Some popular titles include: “Complete Idiot’s Guide to Doing Your
Income Taxes,” the “Procrastinator’s Guide to Taxes Made Easy,” and “Taxes 2005 for Dummies.” Barnes & Noble
Online,
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/results.asp?userid=6A8SaEcBe8&WRD=taxes&sort=S&Go%21.x=1
1&Go%21.y=16 (lasted visited June 21, 2005). As indicated infra at [ ] , for many reasons, including the skills of
low income taxpayers and the perceived and actual complexity of tax benefits, a greater percentage of lower-income
taxpayers uses commercial preparers, rather than self-preparing.
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diverted to the market in the form of preparation and delivery costs.97 The welfare perspective on
the tax system’s delivery mechanism is typically critical, focusing on the way that preparers
drain benefits from the working poor through the peddling of ancillary products and fees
associated with ensuring the delivery of the cash refund to the claimant.98 The tax system’s
perspective on preparers has largely been favorable, with a view that preparers are an integral
part of the system, assisting in the providing of information, helping taxpayers meet their filing
responsibilities, and playing a role in the EITC’s relatively high participation rates.
In effect, however, the role of preparers is both part of the problem and part of the
solution. 99 There is no doubt that taxpayers are easy marks at tax filing time, and that certain
practices of preparers take advantage of the situation. Yet, the high participation rates associated
with the EITC are dependent, in part, on the preparer presence. In the next section, I consider the
compliance implications associated with a system that relies on a largely nondiscretionary
delivery of benefits facilitated by a significant market presence.
V. The Compliance Implications Associated with the High Use of Commercial
Preparers
Accepting Professor Zelenak’s powerful descriptive argument still leaves open the
question as to what the government should do about the EITC compliance problem. Looking at
the compliance efforts over the past few years, the government is trying measures that are not
97 Francine Lipman, The Working Poor are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty
Purse, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 461 [ ] (2003).
98 See, e.g., Carol Elliott, Instant money refund loans under fire from consumer groups, S. BEND TRIB., Feb. 6, 2005,
at B1 (quoting Chi Chi Wu, NCLC staff attorney, “That’s money that is supposed to help working poor families out
of poverty. What they (refund anticipation loans) do is siphon off that money into the pockets of big tax preparer
companies and lenders.”); Rapid refund interest rates prey on poor, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN, Feb. 22, 2005, at
11A. “Some years ago, a few Americans fed up with their tax rates each send their 1040s written on a T-shirt with a
note saying that since the government had taken everything else they own, it ought to have the shirt off their back,
too. These days though, that shirt might as well be given to tax preparers offering rapid refund loans.” Id.
99 See, e.g., Janet Spragens, Testimony Before the IRS Oversight Board 2 (Jan. 26, 2004)
http://www.ustreas.gov/irsob/meetings/1-26-04/auftc.pdf (discussing how despite the cost of preparation, low
income taxpayers rely on preparers to help them meet their filing responsibilities and ensure the claiming of
intended benefits). Spragens perceptively notes that despite the existence of unscrupulous and incompetent
preparers, commercial preparers are part of the solution, as well as part of the problem. Spragens, at 2.
31
typically associated with the tax system. It is looking, in part, to approaches that have their
pedigree in the welfare system and impose direct costs on taxpayers themselves, like pre-
certification and civil sanctions that ban the claiming of the benefit after a prior erroneous claim.
While pre-certification may have merit in decreasing the likelihood that improper claimants seek
the EITC and in detecting erroneous claims, in order for it to be widely implemented, the IRS
will have to dedicate significant resources, at significant cost.100 Likewise, because the use of
civil penalties requires a determination of the intent of the claimant (as only reckless or
fraudulent conduct triggers the penalty’s application), it presupposes that the IRS puts the
resources on the ground to determine whether the penalty is appropriate101 and collect on
assessed penalties.102 Thus, these remedies could reduce improper payments, but result in
significant increases in direct administrative costs.
The lack of discretion in administration and the central role of commercial preparers, two
of the tax characteristics of the hybrid tax/welfare EITC, suggest an approach that could rely to a
greater extent on properly regulated preparers in reducing EITC noncompliance. The goal would
be to shift some of the compliance costs onto third parties and, to a lesser extent, the claimants
themselves. The lack of discretion associated with eligibility for the EITC is important, because
it is generally inappropriate for the market to exercise judgment in applying the law or subjective
100 The total cost to administer the initial certification pilot program, which comprised 50,000 total taxpayers (half in
a test group and half in a control group), was $6.6 million. IRS, EITC Initiative, Final Report to Congress, 44 (Oct.
2005). While there would likely be some economies of scale, the IRS estimated that approximately 54 percent of the
certification pilot’s costs were attributable to labor, suggesting that even if other marginal costs were smaller the
costs for a broad implementation of certification would be substantial.
101 The rare imposition of the penalty reflects the fact that the IRS has not dedicated those types of resources to make
preliminary penalty determinations. National Taxpayer Advocate, 2003 Annual Report 281-82 (Jan. 2004) (detailing
that in FY 2004, the IRS was only conducting 240 audits of preparers); Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance:
One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1145, 1178-84 (2003), discussing the difficulties associated with
imposing civil penalties without significantly increasing government resources on investigating the merits of claims;
Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, UCLA L. REV. 1867,
1896 (2005) noting how seldom the IRS imposes civil EITC disallowance penalties.
102 As the National Taxpayer Advocate has detailed, the IRS seldom collects on civil preparer penalties imposed. See
National Taxpayer Advocate, 2003 Annual Report 281-82 (Jan. 2004) (the IRS only collected 12 percent of the $2.4
million in civil penalties assessed in calendar years 2001 and 2002).
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standards to determining eligibility for benefits or relief from burdens.103 Likewise, the
relatively clear-cut eligibility requirements of the EITC lessen the likelihood that preparers
would play the role of ambiguity exploiters,104 a common characteristic and problem, as the
debate concerning preparers’ role in the recent corporate tax shelter controversy illustrates.105 It
is thus theoretically possible for well-intentioned and qualified preparers to act as front-line
evaluators of eligibility, a role that many in fact perform in the current system. The question is
whether there are legislative or administrative changes that could further enhance this role,
without ratcheting up government costs or taxpayer costs to unacceptable levels.
Before considering the specific proposals that are available, it is worth considering
further the nature of the relationships surrounding commercial return preparers. In part because
of the complexity of the tax system, but also because the annual lump sum nature of benefits
delivered through the tax system allows people to painlessly part with money in a way that
makes expenses less like a cost and more like a smaller windfall,106 individuals are transferring
approximately $1.92 billion to commercial preparers for preparation costs and related
103 An interesting comparison point concerns the recent legislation allowing the IRS to contract with certain private
debt collectors to collect certain federal tax debts. On October 22, 2004, the President signed the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 to permit private collection agencies (PCA) to help collect Federal tax debts. Pub. L. No. 108-
357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). A key aspect of the legislation is the PCA’s lack of discretion in these cases.
Congressional Research Service, The Internal Revenue Service's Use of Private Debt Collection Agencies: Current
Status and Issues for Congress (Jan. 11, 2006) (noting the restrictive guidelines in which the IRS could refer cases to
private debt collectors, including that “PCA’s would be assigned cases that were likely to be resolved with one or
two phone calls and required no exercise of discretion by the IRS”).
104 Marshal Blumenthal and Charles Christian, Tax Preparers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 201, 202 &
217 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (discussing how preparers can play the role of ambiguity exploiters
when there are unclear legal requirements)
105 See John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice Markets in Virtue, 106 Oxford Univ.Press (2005) (discussing the tax
shelter advice market in the United States. Braithwaite analyzes the role of supply (preparer) and demand (taxpayer)
on the rise of tax shelters in the US and Australia, and ways governments can minimize tax avoidance and promote
a general respect for tax integrity. John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice Markets in Virtue, Oxford Univ.Press, 197-
211 (2005). Braithwhite refers to interesting research which suggests that using an agent when there is unambiguous
income sources encourages compliance, but that when there is ambiguity the use of an agent encourages
noncompliance.. John Braithwaite, at 198 (where the “law is clear, tax agents do a lot of the tax authority’s work in
educating taxpayers on what the law requires.”)
106See text surrounding note [ ]
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products.107 A large private sector industry exists to prepare tax returns and peddle products like
refund anticipation loans.108 The relationship between the government, claimants and tax
preparers resembles a partnership, in which the entities all experience significant benefits: the
government gets to deliver benefits relatively cheaply, without the need for systemic delivery
offices along the lines accompanying other benefits’ programs; the government has facilitated
the private preparers’ ability to offer lucrative electronic filing and refund anticipation loans by
revealing to preparers information about a taxpayer’s other debts that would make it unlikely that
preparers would get paid.109 The IRS benefits further from the efficiencies associated with
preparers’ facilitation of electronic return filing, rather than the paper filing that would likely be
done by lower-income taxpayers who are less likely than the average taxpayer to have a
computer or internet access. The typical claimant happily pays high fees to preparers for the
delivery of the refund, a refund which taxpayers often do not fully understand, but certainly
appreciate and use for important life-improving purchases.110
107 Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, All Drain, No Gain: Refund Anticipation Loans Continue to Sap the Hard-Earned
Tax Dollars of Low-Income Americans, National Consumer Law Center and Consumer Federation of America 4,
http://www.consumerlaw.org/ initiatives/ refund_anticipation/ (Jan. 2004) (estimating the amount an average EITC
claimant would spend on commercial tax preparation). A taxpayer receiving a $2100 refund in the form of a RAL
from a major tax preparation chain could expect to pay: 1) a RAL loan fee of $100; 2) a system administration fee of
$30; and 3) a return preparation fee of $120. Thus, the average EITC claimant should expect to pay approximately
$250 in fees for the preparation of her tax return.
108 Tax preparation giants such as H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt have created an enormous business niche with
respect to professional tax preparation. See Robert Baker, Doing the Numbers on a Tax Preparer, BUS. WK., Apr.
26, 2004, at 120 (noting the value of giant tax preparers like Jackson Hewitt and H&R Block and that at “tax time
people sure are easy marks”).
109 For a discussion of the information the IRS shares with tax preparers, see George Guttman, IRS Reinstates Debt
Indicator to Increase Electronic Filing, 85 TAX NOTES 1125, 1125 (1999); See also NCLC, Tax Preparers Peddle
High Priced Tax Refund Loans: Millions Skimmed from the Working Poor and the U.S. Treasury, NCLC and CFA
at 20 (2002). The IRS provides preparers a debt indicator service, which screens RAL applicants and informs
electronic preparers of any federal, state or child-support debts that could result in an offset of a taxpayer’s refund.
110 Jennifer L. Romich & Thomas Weisner, How Families View and Use the EITC: Advance Payment Versus Lump
Sum Delivery, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1245, 1260 (Dec. 2000).
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While partnerships suggest a sharing of losses and profits,111 preparers for the most part
share only in the upside. Apart from rarely imposed and even rarer enforced civil penalties there
is no significant risk or cost associated with preparers who prepare inaccurate returns—as
Professor Spragens astutely observes, when the IRS detects errors “it is the taxpayer who is left
holding the bag in terms of money due, time and stress expended, and potential loss of benefits
in future years.”112
A. Toward a More Refined Understanding of Brokered Noncompliance
As I have previously written, noncompliance associated with or facilitated in some way
by preparers is known as brokered noncompliance. 113 As discussed above, over 57 percent of the
EITC overclaims stem from returns prepared by commercial return preparers. The current error
rate among taxpayers using commercial return preparers suggests that the system is not working
as well as it should. The problem, however, is that while we know the overall error rate among
taxpayers and we know the rate broken down by class of preparer, we do not know why those
errors arose. The key to tailoring effective government responses to noncompliance is
understanding, from a ground-up perspective, what triggers the errors.114
I have directed low-income taxpayer clinics for the past nine years. In that time, my
students and I have represented many hundreds of taxpayers who have improperly claimed the
111 See PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS J. WILLIAM CALLISON AND
MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN §10:3 (2005); see also Uniform Partnership Act § 401(b) (1997).
112 Janet Spragens, Testimony Before the IRS Oversight Board (Jan. 26, 2004). The government can likewise be left
with costs associated with inaccurate returns, reflecting resources spent on addressing the noncompliance problem
and the incorrect benefits that the government credits to taxpayers who are not eligible or who overstate the amount
of EITC.
113 Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1145 (2003). In this
article, I did not focus on the compliance issues relaying to return preparers. Id. at 1154.
114 See GAO, Tax Compliance: Better Compliance Data and Long-Term Goals Would Support a More Strategic IRS
Approach to Reducing the Tax Gap, 17-18GAO-05-753 (July 2005) (noting that understanding the reasons for
noncompliance is critical for IRS and Congress to tailor efforts to reduce the overall tax gap).
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EITC, and roughly two thirds had their tax returns prepared by commercial return preparers. In
my experience, there are three main reasons why a tax return prepared by a commercial return
preparer may have an erroneous EITC claim:
1. Incompetence: The preparer is incompetent, and is unaware of a relevant substantive
rule regarding EITC eligibility or does not have the skills or incentive necessary to gather the
facts that are relevant to determine eligibility. For example, in the Villanova Tax Clinic, we
often see taxpayers claim children as qualifying children even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement due to shared or split custody,
2. Preparer Dishonesty: The preparer is dishonest, and wishes to generate more revenues
from preparing returns or selling additional products or services through improperly received or
overstated EITC claims.
3. Taxpayer Dishonesty: The preparer is both honest and competent, but the taxpayer is
gaming the system and lies to the preparer when asked questions regarding relevant facts to
determine eligibility. For example, in the Villanova Tax Clinic, we have seen numerous
situations when taxpayers “borrowed’ children from relatives who had more than two children or
who had no earned income. This borrowing resulted in taxpayers claiming relatives (often
nephews or nieces or grandchildren) even though the taxpayer did not live with the child. On
inquiry in the Clinic, we have had numerous clients who misrepresented their living situation to
preparers, who prepared the returns accurately, if one takes into account what their clients told
them.
B. The Inadequacy of the Current System to Reduce the Above Types of Errors
. The first two types of brokered noncompliance described above are in essence, supply
driven, namely the errors arise due to the actions of those providing the tax return filing services.
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The third category, relating to taxpayer dishonesty, is demand driven, that is the errors arise not
because of the preparer’s actions, but because the taxpayer herself chooses to provide incorrect
information to the preparer.
That there is a high rate of error among returns prepared by commercial preparers
suggests that the government’s current methods of regulating practitioners are inadequate. We do
not know necessarily whether the government’s efforts should be tailored to reducing the
problems of preparer skills, or addressing honesty of either the taxpayer or the practitioner. What
we do know is that there are different problems, which the government could address by
differing solutions. As a starting point, as a number of observers have echoed since I adapted the
Kidder-McEwen typology to lower-income noncompliance, the IRS should focus its research
efforts on understanding the underlying causes of noncompliance.115 With that information, the
government can better assess what efforts it should undertake, (including possible
nonenforcement actions like educational outreach), as well as properly comparing a proposal’s
costs to its possible benefits. Failing that information, as I suggest below, there are shorter-term
steps that the government can take which take advantage of the presence of commercial
preparers and the lack of discretion associated with EITC eligibility, and which would likely
have an effect on reducing errors irrespective of the source of the problem at relatively low cost
to the government.
There are current penalty and due diligence provisions meant to address return preparer
honesty and competence. The Internal Revenue Code defines a tax return preparer as anyone
115 GAO, GAO, Tax Compliance: Better Compliance Data and Long-Term Goals Would Support a More Strategic
IRS Approach to Reducing the Tax Gap, pp. 17-18 GAO-05-753 (July, 2005) (noting that information relating to the
underlying causes of noncompliance is “critical” to the government’s efforts at reducing the tax gap); NTA,
Testimony Before the Senate Finance Committee on the Tax Gap and Tax Shelters (July 21, 2004) (“Once the key
components of the tax gap have been identified and analyzed, we should consider (1) the causes of noncompliance
and (2) ways to reduce the opportunity for noncompliance. By understanding what triggers or causes a taxpayer or
segment of taxpayers to be noncompliant, the IRS can choose the appropriate method to foreclose noncompliance
opportunities . . .”).
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who prepares, for compensation, or who employs one or more persons for compensation, a tax
return or refund claim.116 While lawyers, enrolled agents and accountants are subject to their own
professional standards and Treasury Department rules for IRS practice,117 so-called unenrolled
preparers are generally only covered by the Code’s penalty and due diligence provisions.
The civil and criminal preparer penalty provisions in the Code meant to ensure minimum
standards of conduct. A $250 civil penalty applies to a preparer who takes a position on a return
or refund claim for which he or she should have known that there was “not a realistic possibility
of being sustained on the merits,” with the possibility of an increase to $1,000 if the
understatement is attributable to a willful attempt to understate a tax liability or due to a reckless
or intentional disregard of rules and regulations 118 In addition, the Code provides that preparers
must provide a copy of a return to taxpayers, sign and place an identifying number on the return,
and maintain a copy of the return for three years. Failing to comply with these requirements
subjects a preparer to a $50 penalty for each failure, up to an annual maximum of $25,000.119
In addition to civil penalties, criminal penalties can also apply to return preparers who (i)
engage in a willful attempt to evade tax,120 (ii) make false statements under penalties of
perjury121 or (iii) who willfully assist, aid, abet, counsel or advise in the preparation of any
document in connection with the revenue laws that is false or fraudulent with respect to a
material matter.122
116 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36).
117 Treasury Department Circular 230 describes who may practice before the IRS and sets minimum standards and
aspirational best practice policies, as well as a disciplinary procedure for violations of its standards. 31 CFR part 10.
118 I.R.C. §§ 6694(a), (b).
119 I.R.C. §§ 6695(a)-(d). The Code also provides civil penalties for a return preparer’s (i) inappropriate disclosure or
use of tax return information (ii) endorsing or negotiating a federal tax refund check. I.R.C. §§ 6713, 6695(f). In
addition, the IRS has the authority to bring a civil action in federal district court seeking injunctive relief to prohibit
certain actions of preparers. I.R.C. § 7407(a).
120 I.R.C. § 7201.
121 I.R.C. § 7206(1).
122 I.R.C. § 7206(2).
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There are also specific due diligence requirements addressed to preparers filing EITC
returns, with preparers required to meet certain due diligence requirements.123 With respect to tax
returns or refund claims involving the EITC, due diligence requirements require return preparers
to complete checklists (“EITC Checklists”) and worksheets regarding information pertaining to
eligibility for the EITC and the amount of the EITC. In addition, the preparer must have no
knowledge or reason to know that the information used to determine eligibility or the amount of
the EITC is incorrect. Preparers may be subject to a $100 penalty for each failure to comply
with the above requirements.124
The IRS rarely invokes and enforces those provisions.125 For example, in fiscal year
2001, of the low $1.6 million in net assessed civil preparer penalties under Code sections 6694
and 6695, the IRS collected only about 1/3 of that amount.126 The IRS has not prioritized
assessing or enforcing preparer penalties,127 and criminal prosecutions of preparers are rarely
undertaken.128 Likewise, audits of EITC return preparers are not a priority for the IRS, as the IRS
planned to conduct only 241 due diligence visits in fiscal year 2004, and resource restraints
limited those audits to only 180 visits.129
C. Recent Proposals to Bolster the Regulatory Regime
123 I.R.C. § 6695(g).
124 I.R.C. § 6695(g).
125 See, e.g., National Taxpayer Advocate’s Annual Report to Congress, Nina Olson National Taxpayer Advocate,
FY 2004 Annual Report to Congress, 77 (2004) (arguing that professional tax preparers go largely unregulated,
creating a serious oversight problem); see also Jay Soled, Third Party Civil Tax Penalties and Professional
Standards, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1611 (noting the inadequacy of the current civil penalty regime).
126 National Taxpayer Advocate, 2004 Annual Report 77 (Jan. 2005).
127 National Taxpayer Advocate, 2003 Annual Report 282 (Jan. 2004) (noting that the IRS stated that it “cannot
afford to make these low dollar paid preparer cases a priority given their responsibility for addressing billions of
dollars in uncollected taxes”).
128 IRS Criminal Investigation Division (CI) initiations of investigations during the three year fiscal year period 2002
through 2004 totaled 254, 229, and 206, with conviction during that period at 64, 67 and 117. National Taxpayer
Advocate, 2004 Annual Report 78-79 (Jan. 2005). CI also investigated preparers as part of its overall “Questionable
refund Program” though it did not break down its investigations in that program between preparers and taxpayers.
Id.
129 National Taxpayer Advocate, 2004 Annual Report 78 (Jan. 2005). Of the 180 visits, the IRS assessed penalties
for failing to comply with the due diligence rules on 29 preparers.
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In response to this relatively light approach to government regulation of preparers and the
high error rate associated with commercially prepared returns, there has been a recent interest in
increasing the regulation of commercial preparers. The reform effort has taken has taken three
broad approaches, all of which comprise the most recent legislative proposal, The Taxpayer
Protection and Assistance Act of 2005:130 1) increasing the scope and severity of penalties
directed toward commercial preparers generally, 2) IRS registration, testing and certification of
those who prepare federal income tax returns, and 3) improving and focusing the EITC due
diligence rules to better address the more common qualifying child EITC errors.
The most controversial of these is the proposal to require registration, certification, and
continuing education of preparers.131 Cono Namorato, the former Director of the Office of
Professional responsibility, the internal IRS office most likely to have direct responsibility over
such a program, has stated that, for a registration and certification program to be adequately
administered, there would have to be a significant expansion of administrative resources.132
While there are possibilities to shift the costs of registration and certification proposal onto third
parties, it is likely that given the size and diversity of the preparer community, a meaningful
130 S. 832 (2005)
131 S. 832 S, Sec. 4 (2005).
132 See e.g., Sheryl Stratton, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Namorato Chastises Errant Professionals, 107 TAX NOTES
1087, 1087 (2005) (discussing Namorato’s recent speech delivered to the American Bar Association Tax Section
Meeting, regarding regulatory efforts to raise the bar for professional tax preparers). Namorato argued that enacting
S. 832 would “pose some nightmares for the IRS Office of Professional Responsibilities (OPR) due to the high costs
involved in realizing the regulations. The OPR would have to grow enormously in order to keep up with these
regulatory efforts.” Others have made similar comments. Janet Spragens, Testimony before IRS Oversight Board
(Jan. 26, 2004), available at U.S. Dept. of Treasury, IRS Oversight Board, at
http://www.ustreas.gov/irsob/meetings/1-26-04/auftc.pdf. (suggesting that mere proposals to regulate members of
the professional tax community are fruitless without efforts toward effective enforcement; however, noting that IRS
resources are not unlimited and may not be available to enforce proposed regulations); Taxpayer Advocate’s Annual
Report to Congress, National Taxpayer Advocate, FY 2004 Annual Report to Congress, 73 (2004) (in response to
IRS arguing that the IRS does not have the resources necessary to administer a federal regulation of tax preparers
program).
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administration of such a program would be a substantial undertaking133 Likewise, the IRS’s
abysmal imposition and enforcement of penalties directed toward preparers is reflective, in part,
of an unwillingness to ratchet up the significant direct administrative costs associated with
investigating and pursuing or prosecuting preparer misconduct.
The real open question regarding certification is exactly what benefit it will provide to the
system. The proposal relies on a significant portion of the errors associated with commercially
prepared returns reflect errors that stem from preparer incompetence. After all, by requiring
preparers to establish competence and continue their education and training, one would expect a
decrease in overclaims that arise from preparer incompetence. That there is a difference in error
rate among different classes of preparers, and that of the estimated 1.2 million commercial return
preparers, approximately 779,000 filed only between 1 and 9 returns, suggests perhaps that skills
play a large role, but it does not in any way prove that point.134
The real challenge, however, in evaluating the merits of a preparer registration and
certification plan is that we do not have any reliable data on whether the errors associated with
the commercially prepared returns arose from lack of skills, or the other reasons I have
identified. The IRS simply does not have this data, (nor has it adequate plans to capture this
data),135 so, even assuming that one could control the program’s administrative costs and tailor it
so that it would improve competence to make a material difference in reducing skill-based errors,
133 See NTA (modifying the initial proposal to permit the annual competency requirement to be met either by testing
or completion of continuing professional education, involving administration by professional groups and contracting
out much of the program's administration on a self-funding basis). Olson testimony Before House Ways and Means
Oversight Subcommittee on July 20, 2005.
134 See Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers in THE CRISIS IN TAX
ADMINISTRATION 148, 171 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (noting that the difference might be
attributable to the characteristics of those who seek different kind of preparers). Likewise, it could relate to different
scruples among classes of preparers. National Taxpayer Advocate, 2002 Annual Report 225-26 (Jan. 2003).
135 GAO, Tax Compliance: Better Compliance data and Long-term Goals Would Support . . ., 05-753 (July 2005) (In
talking about the tax gap generally and the IRS’s inability to understand the underlying causes of noncompliance,
the “IRS does not have firm or specific plans to capture this data”). TIGTA (stating that the NTA’s registration plan
would reflect a major change and at substantial cost) GAO, (stating that there is precious little data about the size of
the problem, much less the benefits of implementing a registration plan).
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it is hard to evaluate its need. For example, it is hard to see how a registration proposal would
address unscrupulous preparers. It could, in fact prove to cause misguided reliance on a preparer
who wears the IRS-certified badge.136 In addition, it is hard to see how the registration proposal
would in any way address demand-driven noncompliance, that is, noncompliance involving a
claimant who misstates facts regarding his income, children or filing status to ensure EITC
eligibility or maximize the amount of EITC receipt.
This is not to suggest that the proposal has no merit; to the contrary, the NTA, the
principal voice advocating for this (though other nationally recognized groups have likewise
called for its adoption)137 has presented a thoughtful proposal, and has been sensitive to
modifications that would likely reduce the administrative costs. Further, it has benefits beyond
EITC compliance. Yet, as errors associated with the EITC, have, in part, driven this issue, more
data is needed to evaluate the likely benefits in terms of specifically reducing the EITC
overclaim rate. For example, if data suggested that a significant portion of errors relate to
preparer incompetence, then the rationale for the proposal is more compelling.138
136 Spragens, Testimony before the IRS Oversight Board (Jan 26, 2004), (“testing low income preparers for technical
knowledge would not deal with the issue of reigning in fraudulent or unethical preparers” . . . and could “cause
unsuspecting taxpayers to rely more confidently on a fraudulent preparer”).
137 ABA Members Submit Comments on Practitioner Licensing Plan (2004), available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts, Tax
Notes Today, 2004 TNT 24-19.
138 One complication, however, is that errors may also relate to competence that is beyond preparers’ substantive tax
knowledge. This is especially true with respect to low-income taxpayers, many of whom may not share the
preparer’s language or culture. There is little doubt that some errors relate to the bridge in culture that exists between
preparer and taxpayer, as my experience in the clinic demonstrates that establishing basic facts can be a significant
challenge. For example, among clients not born in the United States, we have seen a looser understanding as to who
is referred to as a relative, thus creating confusion when we attempt to determine if the relationship test is satisfied.
While language and cultural skills can be imparted through continuing education and sensitivity, errors due to
language or cultural shortfalls, rather than substantive tax knowledge, reflect the general challenges associated with
boosting preparer competence.
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D. Require More Meaningful Due Diligence Rules that Preparers Must File,
Including the Possibility of Different Due Diligence Requirements Depending
Upon the Class of Preparer
As indicated above, honesty of both the preparer and the taxpayer, as well as preparer
competence, are the likely causes for the high error rates among EITC returns prepared by
professional preparers. Without adequate data regarding the relative importance of these factors,
it is difficult to tailor precise remedial measures. However, increasing the requirements on
preparers to inquire, record, retain, and report information, and significantly raising the penalty
for failing to do so, has the potential to address all three sources of errors.
The current EITC due diligence worksheet is not appropriately tailored to the type of
errors specific to the EITC, and should be appropriately focused to address the most important
errors. Current rules require that the preparer keep a record of how and when the information
used to complete the EITC Checklist was obtained, and retain those records for three years.139
The preparer currently does not sign the EITC Checklist under penalties of perjury, nor does he
furnish it to the IRS. This requirement should be modified and directed toward the residency
issue.140 The IRS should require that all preparers complete, sign, and file with the tax return the
EITC Checklist itself. The EITC Checklist should require the preparer to state on what basis the
preparer established that each of the claimed qualifying children lived with the taxpayer for a
minimum of six months.141 For example, the EITC Checklist could list certain common ways
that the preparer obtained this information, such as the taxpayer’s statements, school records or
other original documentation.
139 Treas. Reg. § 6695-1 (year).
140 Other issues which contribute to the error of the EITC, such as an improper filing status or misreported income
(with the exception of the odd EITC incentive of a taxpayer overstating income), are not EITC specific errors and
contribute to understatements of tax generally. For the odd incentive that the EITC crates to overstate or fabricate
income, perhaps the due diligence requirements should elicit information about self-employed taxpayers who first
report earned income and who do not have any income statements from payors.
141 National Taxpayer Report, 2003 Annual Report 293 (Jan. 2004).
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For some high-risk taxpayers, or individuals claiming a qualifying child for the first time,
the due diligence rules should require that they furnish documentation with the tax return or to
preparers that demonstrate that the child satisfies the appropriate eligibility requirement. In
addition, there could be a more detailed due diligence worksheet that would have to be
completed for such taxpayers whom the IRS identifies (the high-risk taxpayers) or who are
claiming a qualifying child for the first time. To reflect the differing error rates among types of
preparers, the IRS could require differing EITC checklists that vary by preparer type or on the
basis of the number of EITC returns a preparer submitted in a prior taxable year.142 It is possible
that the rules might expand to require certain taxpayers to furnish documents, similar to a version
of the current certification pilot the IRS is undertaking. A way to reduce the government cost in
this arrangement is to permit preparers to receive documentation on behalf of the IRS. Preparers
who receive documentation establishing the residence of the child would indicate that in a
submitted EITC due diligence EITC Checklist, and be required to retain those records. In the
absence of such documentation, the rules should require the preparer to describe on the modified
EITC Checklist why the taxpayer does not have the documents, such as that they do not exist or
are unable to be obtained. For taxpayers unable to provide documentation but who tell the
preparer that the child resided with the taxpayer for the appropriate period, the preparer would
likewise disclose to the IRS why such documentation was insufficient or unable to be
obtained.143
142 Braithwhite similarly suggests that the government should target audits from taxpayers with the greatest risk
profile to “clients of tax preparers whose portfolio of clients as a group have the worst compliance record.”
Braithwaite Markets in Vice, at 13. While this is challenging due to the hundreds of thousands of small preparers,
the notion of differing compliance strategies or requirements based upon the likely quality and scruples of the
preparer has merit. Less onerous requirements should apply to honest accurate preparers, thus creating additional
incentive for taxpayers to use preparers who may be able to assist in limiting noncompliance.
143 For example, it is possible that frequent moves or periods of homelessness would prevent taxpayers from
documenting residence of children.
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What are the benefits of this? Shifting this requirement to the worksheet would thus
ensure that preparers transmit this information to the IRS, whereas now, only the handful of
preparer audits results in any government consideration of this information. This could reduce
the incidence of errors attributable to preparer incompetence, as the affirmative obligation would
likely result in preparers actually thinking through and understanding the appropriate eligibility
requirements.144 Requiring the preparer to sign and submit the worksheet likely would also deter
taxpayers who are dishonest, as the increasing preparer questions on the subject might chill
taxpayers who would otherwise slide by without a preparer focus in the issue. In addition, it
would allow better educated and more literate preparers the opportunities to explain taxpayer
circumstances. This reduces chances of miscommunication in correspondence from the IRS to
taxpayers.
What about the issue of unscrupulous preparers? Likewise, requiring the preparer to
describe on what basis he knows that the residency requirement is satisfied may make it less
likely that an unscrupulous preparer will feign ignorance. Yet, it is hard to imagine that these
rules would have a significant effect on preventing the actions of dishonest preparers unless they
were backstopped by an increase in the severity and type of civil penalties that can be imposed
on preparers, a more meaningful IRS auditing of the preparer community, and a commitment to
collecting on any properly imposed civil penalties.145 Yet, any meaningful audit and penalty
144 National Taxpayer Advocate, 2003 Annual Report 293 (Jan. 2004).
145 Recent empirical literature addressing compliance suggests that given the odds of detection and severity of
penalties, most taxpayers are irrationally compliant. See Braithwhite, at 198. Bolstering audit rates and severity of
penalties would change the calculus, but note again that the uncertainty in understanding whether the noncompliance
is more demand or supply driven brings into question where the government should focus its efforts. Better data
would allow Congress to draft appropriate penalties and the IRS to commit sufficient resources on the ground.
For a discussion of an increased civil penalty regime that could be applied to preparers, see National Taxpayer
Advocate, 2003 Annual Report 293 (Jan. 2004). The government should eliminate incentives that encourage
preparers whose dishonesty may be dependent upon taxpayers’ eligibility for the EITC. Thoughtful proposals have
been made to reduce the demand for products like refund anticipation loans, and the likelihood that taxpayers would
visit commercial return preparers who push ancillary products. See, e.g., Michael Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE
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regime would ratchet up government costs. Given that the IRS lacks an understanding of the
reasons why commercially prepared returns have a high error rate, it is understandable that the
IRS has not shown that commitment. As such, the discussion of prescriptive policy proposals
would greatly benefit from research examining the underlying causes of errors associated with
commercially prepared returns.146
VII. Conclusion
The EITC is a strange part of our nation’s anti-poverty landscape. Not purely tax, nor
purely welfare, its administration has been part of the tax administration and its effect
increasingly redistributive. While the EITC cannot replace other benefit provisions due to the
inherent structural limitations of the tax system, it does offer many benefits, including lower
administrative costs and higher participation.
The EITC’s Achilles Heel has been its relatively high error rates, relative to welfare
programs. There has been little careful analysis concerning the methods with which the
government should tackle the EITC’s error rates, with some low–income-taxpayer advocates
J. ON REG. 121 (2004) (arguing that governmental incentives can harness market and technological forces to expand
access to financial services for the poor). Barr argues that the IRS should expand free tax preparation and electronic
filing availability, and that the IRS should permit refunds to be direct deposited into more than one bank account so
“tax preparers could compete by offering tax preparation services that are paid not out of the proceeds of RALs, but
paid directly to them electronically out of tax refunds through direct deposit to them of a portion of the refund,
diminishing the risk to the preparer and eliminating one reason to take out a RAL.” Id. at 175.
146 While this article does not focus on the errors associated with self-prepared returns, or returns prepared by
volunteer organizations that prepare low income tax returns for free, a similar understanding of the reasons why
errors appear on those returns would also greatly assist policymakers. Recent studies looking at volunteer return
prepares have found significant errors on volunteer-prepared tax returns, and have suggested how certain practices at
those sites could reduce errors. See Treasury's Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), "Improvements
Are Needed to Ensure Tax Returns Are Prepared Correctly at Internal Revenue Service Volunteer Income Tax
Assistance Sites," August 2004, 2004-40-154. The following year's study found some improvement: 23 out of 35
returns (66%) were incorrect. TIGTA, "Significant Improvements Have Been Made in the Oversight of the
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program, but Continued Effort Is Needed to Ensure the Accuracy of Services
Provided," November 2005, 2006-40-004 (noting how in some volunteer programs volunteers did not refer to
appropriate checklist questions nor perform adequate quality control).
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bemoaning the IRS’s relatively high attention to lower-income taxpayers, with the IRS and some
academics noting that relative to welfare recipients EITC beneficiaries have faced much less
compliance activity. Recent years have seen compliance proposals that are radical in terms of
tax administration but consistent with the burdens in other benefit programs. This article reveals
that the prism that the government should use in its efforts to reduce the error rate should reflect
the EITC’s unique characteristics, including the high use of commercial preparers and the
relative lack of discretion associated with benefit eligibility. There is the potential for an
increased shifting of some of the compliance costs onto those in the private market who prepare
tax returns. The lack of data associated with the underlying causes of EITC noncompliance
hamper any discussion of prescriptive policies requiring a significant commitment of
government resources. Absent that data, this article argues that compliance efforts should take
advantage of the presence of commercial return preparers, and the relative lack of discretion
associated with eligibility
